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A DISSENTER'S COMMENTARY ON THE
PROFESSIONALISM CRUSADE*
ROB ATKINSON**
The Solemn League and Covenant
Now brings a smile, now brings a tear.
But sacred Freedom, too, was theirs:
If thou'rt a slave, indulge thy sneer.,
Introduction
In 1986 the ABA Commission on Professionalism issued a report
entitled "...In the Spirit ofPublic Service:" A Blueprintfor the Rekindling
of Lawyer Professionalism.2 This report fanned into flame a concern that
*Copyright 1994 Rob Atkinson
**Rob Atkinson, B.A. 1979, Washington and Lee University, J.D. 1982, Yale Law
School, is Associate Professor ofLaw at Florida State University College of Law.
Author'sNote: I would like to thank Adam Hirsch and Mark Seidenfeld for reading
earlier versions of this paper. I very much appreciate the research assistance of
Andrew Coomes, Elizabeth Daley, Brian Iten, and Jacqueline Lebel and the
generous support of the Florida State University College of Law. Finally, I would
like to thank the members of the Florida Bar Commission on Lawyer Profession-
alism, with whom I served from 1987 to 1989, and the current members of its
successor, the Florida Bar Committee on Professionalism, to whom I act as law
school liaison. Though we have frequently found ourselves in disagreement, my
appreciation for their work informs every page of this paper.
I Robert Bums, "The Solemn League and Covenant." In The Poems and
Songs of Robert Burns 361 (James Barke, ed., 1960).
2 American Bar Ass'n. Commission on Professionalism, "..Jn the Spirit of
Public Service:" aBlueprintfortheRekindling ofLawyer Professionalism (1986),
reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243. [hereinafter ABA COMMISSION]
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had been smoldering since the late 1960s. Anointed with this Pentecostal
fire, apostles of professionalism have enlisted an imposing army of
converts. State and local bar associations, even a federal judicial circuit,
have offered their constituents an array of plans for retaking the Holy Land
of legal practice, and particularly its most sacred shrines, the courts of law,
from a host of infidels, heretics, and apostates. 3 The word from the
academic cloister has generally been one of benediction, if not quite
enthusiasm; even those who come to scoff at particular proposals generally
stay to praise the crusade's spirit and ideals.4
With respect (and not entirely without reverence), this paper registers
a deeper protest. It does not suggest that we burn the ABA's profession-
alism bull, which contains some insightful, even inspired, ideas. But it
does post several theses for discussion: in particular, the crusade's implicit
assumption of one true professional faith and its tendency to condemn
categorically certain modes of conduct as unprofessional.
3 See, e.g., Committee on Civility, Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, Final
Report (1992), reprinted in 143 F.R.D. 441; Commission on Lawyer Profession-
alism, Florida Bar, Professionalism: A Recommitment of the Bench, the Bar and
the Law Schools of Florida (1989)[hereinafter Florida Commission]; Special
Committee on Professionalism, Illinois State Bar Ass'n, The Bar, the Bench and
Professionalism in Illinois, 76 ILL. B.J. 441 (1988)[hereinafter Illinois Commit-
tee]. For an extensive listing of additional codes and creeds, see Patrick E. Longan,
"The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials." 35 ARIZ.
L. REV. 663,681 n.98; Catherine Therese Clarke, "Missed Manners in Courtroom
Decorum." 50 MD. L. REV. 945,949 n. 10 (1991); 1 The ProfessionalLawyer 12-
13 (1989-90). For a compilation of professionalism reports, see Clarke, supra, at
1012 n.320.
4 Ronald D. Rotunda, "Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the
Report of the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism." 18
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1149, 1179 (1987) (criticizing some of the ABA Report's
proposals, but "applaud[ing] the effort it represents"); Nancy J. Moore, "Profes-
sionalism Reconsidered." 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773 (criticizing ABA
Commission's inattention to scholarly studies of professionalism, but hailing its
effort to call lawyers back to their moral obligations). See also Timothy P. Terrell
& James H. Wildman, "Rethinking 'Professionalism."' 41 EMORY LJ. 403
(1992).
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These religious metaphors are borrowed from the professionalism
movement itself. Its formal proposals tend to call for a return to a common
professional faith, the supposedly shared beliefs and commitments of
which are enshrined in documents described as "creeds," "oaths," and
"pledges" of professionalism. Even when these documents are called
codes, they are codes that read more like the Decalogue than the UCC or,
for that matter, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.5 The
former titles imply, with perhaps a profounder accuracy than their authors
intended, that the documents they describe are articles of faith.
My borrowing of the crusade's religious imagery is not the irreverent
parodying of an unsympathetic outsider. Along with the crusaders, I
believe that drafting and promulgating such statements is an entirely
appropriate undertaking, and, more generally, that a revival of profes-
sional commitments is much to be sought. These quests are, however,
fraught with dangers. I am afraid the present crusaders are not entirely
aware of these dangers; my choice of religious metaphors is designed to
underscore them and to suggest a way to avoid them without ignoring the
positive aspects of the crusaders' message.
One danger is that pious pronouncements may mask purposes of an
altogether different kind. We have it on the authority of the Old Testament
Prophets and the New Testament Gospels that the purest forms of sincerity
and selflessness exist in close, and perhaps inseparable, proximity to the
crassest forms of hypocrisy and self-aggrandizement. Like patriotism and
religion, professionalism, too, may be a popular refuge for scoundrels, but
can scarcely be condemned in its entirety on their account. Nor is much to
be gained by inspecting their eyes for motes or their hearts for ulterior
motives.
But to eschew looking into the hearts of others is not to recommend
ignoring the contents of our own. Thus, in assessing the professionalism
crusade, we would do well to be mindful of the agonizing observation of
5 Except, tellingly, for the Code's "Ethical Considerations," which have no
analogue in the Model Code's successor, the ABA's 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.
ROB ATKINSON
Eliot's St. Thomas A Becket: "The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason." 6 Humility is in order, of course,
for dissenters as well as crusaders. Even those who admire Luther's
reformation must be haunted by Charles V's words to a mere Saxon monk:
"Are you alone wise?"
Another danger is that those who object to the present professionalism
crusade will be denounced as heretics, enemies of a shared professional
faith. Mindful of this, I have chosen to describe the position from which
I comment on the crusade as that of a dissenter. To accept the sincerity,
even virtue, of the crusade while pointing rather insistently to its dangers
and false assumptions is to adopt the position of a dissenter. The dissenter's
position vis-A-vis orthodoxy, like mine vis-A-vis the crusade, has an
essential duality. Most obviously, it bespeaks disagreement, and disagree-
ment rooted in what the dissenter perceives as an unfortunate departure on
the part of the orthodox. More fundamentally, however, dissent implies
underlying agreement, agreement on the common ground from which the
dissenter believes the erring orthodox have strayed.
So it is with my dissent from the current crusade. Our common ground
is what I shall referto as "liberal legalism."7 For present purposes, its basic
assumptions can be reduced to these: our society and its legal system are
basically just,8 their imperfections are to be corrected by institutionally
authorized mechanisms of reform (including civil disobedience), and the
6 T. S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral
7 Identifying liberal legalism as the faith I share with the proponents of the
professionalism crusade relieves me of the task of debating the merits of that faith
with outsiders. For present purposes, it is a given, notbecause it is or can be proved,
but because it is the shared belief of my primary audience. Nevertheless, this
discussion has an implicitly extra- as well as intra-mural aspect. As I shall argue
below, part of the task of liberal legalism is to decide how to deal with outsiders,
and part of the commitment of liberal legalism is to reach that decision in dialogue
with them.
8 1 am borrowing the notion of an acceptable approximation to justice from
Rawls, who uses the shorthand expressions "near justice" and "reasonably just."
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result of that reform should be recognizable as an elaboration of values
already widely shared by the citizenry and at least inchoately present in
existing laws. As particularly relevant to lawyers, liberal legalism entails
the notion that the lawyer's proper role is derivative from, and subordi-
nate to, the goal of achieving just outcomes through the existing legal
system or its reformed successors.
The crusade falsely assumes that conscientious lawyers agree on
their proper role in liberal legalism to a much greater extent than is
actually the case. My dissent from the professionalism crusade is
premised on the belief that there are other and perhaps better understand-
ings of the lawyer's role in liberal legalism than the crusade implies. The
model of lawyering that the crusade holds up as its standard is certainly
not the only one available, and arguably not the best.9
Talk of the common ground underlying orthodoxy and dissent
implies the existence of some who do not share that ground, those who
are outside the fold, if not beyond the pale. Here lies a third danger:
crusades are not noted for their generosity in dealing with those they
identify as infidels. Those who would spread the Gospel of profession-
alism would do well to bear in mind that lawyers and others of good faith
may not share their faith.
Here the religion metaphor approaches reality. At least since the late
Enlightenment, one serious strand of theological thought has come to see
religion as having to do less with our orientation toward the divinity and
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 350-55 (1971). This is not to say, however, that
all adherents to liberal legalism agree that it is Rawls's particular notion of the
justice that our society does or should approximate.
9 Terrell and Wildman, supra note 4, at413-14,422-24, emphasize the rising
moral diversity of the bar as a critical factor in the decline of professionalism and
urge re-emphasis of lawyers' common commitment to the rule of law as the needed
corrective. They overlook, however, what I shall emphasize below: the diversity
of views among those committed to the rule of law on what mode of lawyering
follows from that commitment.
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the hereafter, and more with our orientation toward what ultimately
concerns us, what we are fundamentally committed to.' 0 These concerns
and commitments may, but need not, refer to the objects of conventional
religious faith. In that sense, the mode of professional life to which we as
lawyers commit ourselves is analogous to, if not indistinguishable from,
a religious commitment.
As in matters of religion, so in matters of professional aspiration, we
are unlikely to come to full agreement, and we are almost certainly not
going to be able to bring other conscientious people to our belief by force
of either argument or arms. This is, of course, precisely the premise
reached by English liberals of Locke's generation in the wake of the
Puritan Revolution and the Stuart Restoration. They, accordingly, legal-
ized most forms of religious dissent, and their American emulators went
further, enshrining not only freedom of religious exercise, but also
disestablishment of religion, in the First Amendment.
My dissent from the professionalism crusade takes the religion
parallel seriously by treating various visions of professionalism as com-
peting faiths. On the analogy of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, I recommend that agencies of the state, particularly the courts and
unified bar associations, refrain from punitively enforcing particular
visions of professionalism, except to the extent necessary for the admin-
istration of justice. Voluntary bar associations would be free to enforce
their particular creeds upon their members and to expand their member-
ship by proselytizing. The merits of particular professional creeds-should
10 The phrase "ultimate concern" is from Paul Tillich, one of the leading
exponents of this perspective. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of Foundations 63-66
(1962). The concept is traceable back at least as far as Ludwig Feuerbach's 1841
Essence of Christianity. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: From
the Enlightenment to Vatican 1 186-87 (1971). See also United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 180 (1964) (citing theological views of Tillich as falling within the
definition of "religious" for purpose of determining conscientious objector status).
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be discussed freely among students and teachers in law schools and among
clients, counsel, and judges to a much greater extent than at present.
Part I identifies what "professionalism" has come to mean in the
context of the present crusade, as distinguished in particular from a broader
sense of the word current in economics and sociology. Part II briefly sets
out the history of the perception that lawyer professionalism has been on
the decline and outlines the various remedial proposals with which the bar
and bench have responded. We shall see in Part ImI that problems with the
methods of earlier professionalism crusades have led to efforts to identify
common values and restore a commitment to them, to rekindle a shared
professional faith. That approach, I will try to show, fails to take account
of a multiplicity of modes of lawyering, some conscientiously practiced,
some not. In Part IV, I identify those modes; in Part V, I show how the
crusade fails to deal with them adequately. Finally, in Part VI, I sketch how
the trinity of institutions generally invoked by the crusade-bar associa-
tions, the courts, and law schools-could better advance those aspects of
the professionalism crusade that are consistent with, if not constituent of,
the faith of liberal legalism.
I. The Elusive Meaning of 'Professionalism."
The first thing we need to note is the confusing contemporary meaning
of "professionalism." Even the ABA Blueprint," one of the canonical
sources of the crusade, Delphically declares that "'Professionalism' is an
elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard to pin
down." Similarly, the Report of the Florida Bar Commission on Profes-
sionalism12 admits 'There is no universally accepted definition of'profes-
II ABA Commission, supra note 2, at 10.
12 Florida Commission, supra note 3, at 11; Cf. Illinois Committee, supra
note 3, at 451, stating: "[The Special Committee on Professionalism] feels that the
need for promoting professionalism, however defined, is important to the bar and
the public, relevant to every area in which Illinois lawyers are active and likely to
be needed indefinitely." (emphasis added).
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sionalism."' More pointedly, a recent article 13 observed that "[L]awyers
have sought a cure for a disease before agreeing on its nature, symptoms,
and cause."
For our purposes, it is useful to distinguish between a broad and a
narrow sense of the term "professionalism." The broad sense is one
familiar to sociologists and economists of the professions. For them, a
profession is an occupation that enjoys special privileges, such as exclu-
sive licensing and self-regulation,justified by a claim to be operating in the
public interest. Professions exist, in this view, to provide services that are
not adequately available in an essentially unregulated market, usually
owing to information asymmetries between the providers of the service
and its consumers.14 Social scientists, it is fair to say, debate inconclusively
among themselves whether and to what extent the special privileges
professionals enjoy are warranted and the asserted public service is a
justification or an excuse. 15
13 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 4, at 403. See also Rotunda, Lawyers and
Professionalism, supra note 4, at 1157-59 (criticizing ABA Report's amorphous
conception of professionalism); Moore,Professionalism Reconsidered, supra note
4, at 777-88 (same).
14 This is a drastic simplification; for a useful overview of the received
wisdom, see Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics, 33-62 (1992);
Moore, supra note 4, at 782-84.
15 With the standard defenses of professionalism as publicly beneficial, cf.,
e.g., Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis
(1977); Richard L. Abel, "United States: The Contradictions of Professionalism."
In I Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World 186-243 (Richard L. Abel &
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988). For criticisms aimed at the American Bar's recent
reform efforts, see Richard L. Abel, "Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?" 59 TEX. L. REV 639 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, "Why the ABA Bothers:
A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes." 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981);
Ted Schneyer, "Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct." 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677-737 (1989). For a
balanced response to the critics, see Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, "The
Redemption of Professionalism?" In Lawyers' ldealslLawyers' Practices: Trans-
formations in the American Legal Profession 230-35 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992).
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I do not mean to enter that debate here; 161 want to take the professional
status of lawyering as given, and focus on a particular set of concerns that
have come to be placed under the heading of professionalism in a second,
narrower, sense. Most simply put, it is thatpart of professionalism thatlies
beyond what is enforceable by hard-and-fast, binding legal rules. These
rules are embodied in the official lawyer codes of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia, and in other state and federal law governing the
practice of law, a corpus that has come to be known as "the law of
lawyering." 17 This body of law requires lawyers to give competent
16 It bears mention, however, that the truth almost certainly lies somewhere
between the extreme positions staked out by some participants in the debate. Only
the most cynical reductionist can dismiss all regulation of the practice of law as
monopolistically motivated and ignore evidence of public-spirited activity on the
part of official bar organizations and elite lawyers. See Gordon & Simon, supra
note 16; Marvin E. Frankel, "Why Does Professor Abel Work at a Useless Task?"
59 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1981). Market failures, in particular information asymme-
tries and externalities (both positive and negative), mark the delivery of legal
services as appropriate targets for corrective measures, see Thomas D. Morgan,
"The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility." 90 HARV. L. REV. 702,
710-11 (1977) and altruistic motivations on the part of lawyers, individually and
collectively, cannot be discounted altogether without risk of reductionism or
circular reasoning. See Rhode & Luban, supra note 15, at 60. On the other hand,
much historical regulation can best be seen as self-aggrandizing or, at best,
paranoidly self-defensive. And some of the classic pronouncements of lawyerly
selflessness transcend hyperbole and approach inadvertent humor. See, e.g.,
Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, 5 (1953) (tellingly
subtitled "With particular reference to the Development of Bar Associations in the
United States"): "The term [profession] refers to a group of men pursuing a learned
art as a common calling in the spirit of a public service-no less a public service
because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood." It is hard to see what the
current professionalism crusade hopes to gain by its frequent allusions to this kind
of moral over-reaching. See Illinois Committee, supra note 3 (quoting Dean
Pound); ABA Commission, supra note 2 (incorporating into title and quoting more
fully in text).
17 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, I The Law of
Lawyering:A Handbook on the ModelRules of Professional Conduct § 101 (2d ed.
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representation,18 forbids them to be actively dishonest,19 and, more gener-
ally, insists that they obey other laws.20
If you subtract this "law of lawyering" from the broad meaning of
"professionalism," the residue is the narrower meaning of professionalism
on which I want to focus. It has to do with things like tacky advertising;
sharp or abusive, but not quite illegal, practices; and incivility toward
judges, witnesses, opposing counsel, and opposing parties. To sum up this
distinction with something of a paradox, professionalism in the narrow
sense covers those obligations of lawyers as lawyers that are not legally
enforceable. Lawyers are thought to be bound by the standards of profes-
sionalism, but the binding force of these standards does not derive from
their legal enforceability.
II. Origins of the Current Professionalism Crusade.
The current professionalism crusade focuses on professionalism in
the second, narrow sense that I have identified. Politically, the crusade has
its roots in reaction to the radical politics of the 1960s, especially the
disrespect some radical lawyers showed toward the judicial system. They
were contemptuous of it, and they were fairly frequently held in contempt,
in both the legal and the lay sense of the term.2 1 This aspect of the crusade
1990 & Supp. 1993); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1992).
18 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1. 1. (1983).
19 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(c) (1983).
20 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.2(d) and 8.4(b) (1983).
21 See, e.g., Norman Dorsen & Leon Friedman, Disorder in the Court: Report
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on
Courtroom Conduct 3-9 (1973) (reporting widespread concern based on a few
highly publicized trials like those of the Black Panthers and the Chicago Seven, but
finding relatively few incidents of politically motivated disruptive courtroom
conduct). Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in
ModernAmerica 288-92 (1976); See also AlexanderM. Bickel, Watergate and the
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is quite evident, for example, in Justice Burger's 1971 speech on civility
to the American Law Institute.22
Broader, and I think more significant, have been the economic and
sociological changes in the practice of law, particularly since mid-century.
These include the burgeoning number of lawyers, the weakening of social
and personal ties between lawyers, and the increasing economic competi-
tiveness of the practice. Cumulatively, these changes have made tradi-
tional, informal methods of socializing and controlling lawyers less
effective23 and have led to calls for redoubling efforts to uphold profes-
sional standards.24
Typically a state bar association will launch a special commission on
professionalism, which dutifully produces a report bemoaning the decline
in professionalism; detailing the sins of the bar itself, law schools, and the
judiciary; and prescribing a regimen of penance for each of the three guilty
institutions. These regimens vary in their particulars, but in broad outline
involve pretty much the same features.
Let us look first at the role of the organized bar. The professionalism
commission becomes, generally at its own recommendation, a permanent
Legal Order, 57 Commentary 19 (1974); Clarke, "Missed Manners in Courtroom
Decorum," supra note 3, at 952.
22 Warren E. Burger, "The Necessity for Civility." 52 F.R.D. 211, 213 (197 1)
("At the drop of the hat-or less-we find adrenalin-fueled lawyers cry out that
theirs is a 'political trial.' This seems to mean in today's context-at least to
some-that rules of evidence, canons of ethics and codes of professional con-
duct-the necessity for civility-all become irrelevant."). See also id. at 217-18
("Some few of them (i.e. uncivil lawyers] seem bent on destroying the system and
some are simply ill-mannered and undisciplined noisemakers.").
23 Murray L. Schwartz, "The Death and Regeneration of Ethics." 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 953, 959.
24 Here again, former Chief Justice Burger's voice has been prominent. See,
e.g., Warren E. Burger, "The State of Justice." 70 ABA J. 62 (1984).
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committee of the sponsoring bar association.25 The committee's mandate
is to further the goals of the crusade on an on-going basis, and in particular
to oversee the implementation of its proposals. Though these often refer
to the need to tighten existing standards or increase enforcement efforts,
the recognition of the limits of these approaches is frequently explicit.
More typical methods of the crusade are exhortation and instruction; the
committee is to function less as an inquisition, ferreting out heresy, and
more as an Office for the Propagation of the Gospel, encouraging the
faithful and converting the heathen. In the case of the ABA, the committee
produces its own periodical, The Professional Lawyer.26
In conjunction with these latter aims, the sponsoring bar association
promulgates one or more unenforceable sets of supplementary standards,
generally redactions of the ABA's "creeds," "pledges," "oaths," or"codes"
lightly edited by the professionalism commission for local consumption.
The ostensible function of these supplementary standards varies some-
what. Sometimes they are just to serve as "guidelines" or "bases for
discussion," a catechizing function.27 But sometimes adherence is to be a
25 See, e.g., Florida Commission, supra note 3, Recommendation 25, at 28
("The Florida Bar should create a standing committee on lawyer professionalism
the purpose of which would be to assist in the implementation of programs
designed to encourage professionalism."); Illinois Committee, supra note 3, at 451
(proposing appointment of a two-year task force on professionalism to "recom-
mend an appropriate structure for an ongoing I(llinois] S[tate] B[ar] A[ssociation]
promotion of professionalism").26 Special Coordinating Committee, American Bar Association, THE PRO-
FESSIONAL LAWYER (published quarterly).27 Thus, at its August 1988 meeting, the ABA House of Delegates officially
recommended that state and local bar associations "encourage their members to
accept as a guide for their individual conduct, and to comply with, a lawyer's creed
of professionalism." To that end, the House of Delegates voted to disseminate a
"Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism" drafted by the ABA Torts and Insurance
Practice Section and a "Lawyers' Pledge of Professionalism" drafted by the ABA
Young Lawyers Section. The House of Delegates was, however, quite explicit that
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condition of entrance or continued membership, 28 a kind of forced bap-
tism. Finally, the sponsoring bar association solemnly pledges to co-
operate with the other relevant institutions, the judiciary and the law
schools, to promote the principles of professionalism.
The judiciary, for its part, is to support the canons of professional
conduct, either at the behest of the bar or, occasionally, on its own
initiative. This support is to take the form of fatherly and informal
warnings to the offenders against civility, or of sterner measures up to and
including use of the contempt power, somewhat inconsistently enforcing
"soft"rules with "hard" sanctions 29-theprofessionalismcrusade's equiva-
lent of burning heretics. Judicial support may also take the form of
imposing courses on professionalism as prerequisites to bar admission or
as continuing legal education requirements. 30
Law schools, for their part, are to lay the moral and social foundation
for the sacred vocation of law, properly catechizing the novitiate in
reverence, decorum, and deportment. This is to be done not just in
mandatory courses on legal ethics and professional responsibility, but
these actions were not intended to alter a lawyer's enforceable professional
obligations in any way. See ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Con-
duct 01:401 (1994).28 See Committee on Civility, supra note 3, FINAL REPORT 9 (1992) (Final
Recommendation 2) (requiring adherence as condition of bar admission).
29 See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Assoc, 121
F.R.D. 284,288 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (calling for full range of Rule 11 sanctions for
incivility).30 See, e.g., The Florida Bar Continuing Legal Education Committee and the
Trial Lawyers Section, "Taking the High Road" (March 18 and 19, 1993) (bar-
sponsored seminar in which, according to promotional material, "Some of the most
talented, well-respected trial lawyers in Florida will discuss how professional
conduct is more effective with judges and jurors, how unprofessional conduct
adversely affects clients, and will reveal techniques for dealing with unprofes-
sional conduct."); Clarke, "Missed Manners," supra note 3, at 950 (reporting that
Maryland requires all new members of the bar to take a course on civility).
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throughout the curriculum. And the curriculum is to be supplemented by
visits ofjudges and practitioners who will bear testimony to the virtues of
professionalism and the evils of its opposites. Typical of this trilateral
effort to create the appropriate professional atmosphere is the new passion
for Inns of Court programs.
Ill. The Proposed Solutions and Their Problems.
The current crusade, with its emphasis on communal recommitment
to shared values embodied in creeds, pledges, and oaths, is usefully seen
as a response, perhaps not entirely conscious in some quarters, to deficien-
cies in other available approaches.
A. Legalism and Its Limits.
The first remedial method is what I will call "legalism," which
involves bringing legally enforceable prescriptions or proscriptions to
bear on the problem. For those trained in law, this is particularly appealing.
If things are not going as they should, then fire off a law requiring that they
shall. This was the principal method of earlier professionalism crusades;
they gave us the present system of mandatory legal education, virtually
universal bar admission exams, and three ABA-promulgated lawyer codes
in this century.31
With respect to the last of these developments, dissatisfaction with the
open texture and hortatory tone of each code was specifically cited as part
31 Auerbach, UnequalJustice, supra note 21, at 94-102; Robert Stevens, Law
School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (1983); Robert
Stevens, "Democracy and the Legal Profession; Cautionary Notes." 3 LEARN-
ING & L., Fall 1976, at 12, 16. The ABA's three codes are: Canons of Professional
Ethics (1908); Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1983).
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of the reason for drafting a successor; the answer to leaky legal rules was
to shore up and plug gaps with new and tighter rules.32
Efforts in this direction continue in the present crusade. The bar, for
example, is still trying to channel, if no longer to dam, the spate of lawyer
advertising, and both the bench and the bar still try to forbid frivolous
litigation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which deals with this
problem, has been overhauled twice in the last decade.33 What this
approach does, obviously, is to roll back the residual, narrow category of
"professionalism" by increasing the range of professional conduct that is
subject to binding legal regulation.
There are, however, problems with this legal irredentism, problems
implicitly recognized in the crusade's shift to other emphases. Some
conduct long denounced as unprofessional by the bar is now protected
under the Constitution or other federal law. Thus, for example, a broad
range of lawyer advertising is now protected as commercial speech under
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona34 and its progeny, 35 and price competition
enjoys the protection of the Sherman Antitrust Act after Goldfarb v.
32 See, e.g. Abel, "Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?" supra note
15, at642 n.21 (1969 drafting committee's criticism of vagueness of 1908 canons);
Walter P. Armstrong, "A Century of Legal Ethics." 64 ABA J. 1063,1069 (1978)
(citing ABA President Powell's call for the standards to be "capable of enforce-
ment").
33 97 F.R.D. 165 (U.S. April 28,1983) (Supreme Court ordering amendment
of numerous provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 11,
effective August 1, 1983); 61 U.S.L.W. 4365 (U.S. April 22, 1993) (Supreme
Court ordering further amendments to Federal Rules, again modifying Rule 11,
effective December 1, 1993).
34 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (newspaper advertising of set fees for routine
services).
35 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(including accurate statements of law in newspaper advertising); Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (direct mail advertising); Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 US. 91 (1990)
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Virginia State Bar.36 In these and other areas, 37 the bar's strategy of
forbidding all that federal law has not protected has at best covered a hard-
fought, and not entirely heroic, campaign of retreats, reverses, and rear-
guard actions.
More significantly, some of the conduct is difficult to define under
clear and enforceable legal rules-the "know-it-when-I-see-it" prob-
lem.38 This problem has two aspects relevant to our purposes. The first has
to do with vexatiously motivated or legally unwarranted claims, defenses,
and other filings; the second has to do with incivility. In dealing with each
aspect of this problem, legalism encounters a paradox. With respect to the
first, the paradox is the need to draft and implement black-letter rules that
enjoin obedience to the spirit, as well as the letter, of the law.39 If, as I
suspect, there is wisdom in the dictum that the letter kills while the spirit
gives life, we cannot expect much vitality, or even coherence, in the letter
(identifying certification as trial specialist by National Board of Trial Advocacy on
letterhead); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (listing areas of practice in print
advertisements).
36 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37 See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, supra note 32, DR 2-
103(D)(4) (1969) (addressing group legal service plans, explicitly forbidding what
is not constitutionally protected).38 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (. Stewart, concurring). See
also 1 Hazard and Hodes, supra note 17 at 560 (alluding to Justice Stewart's
pornography standard in frivolous litigation context).
39 This approach is reflected not only in official commentary on the law of
lawyering-see, e.g.,ModelRulesofProfessionalConduct, "Preamble: A Lawyer's
Responsibilities" ("A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate
purposes and not to harass or intimidate others."); Model Rules, "Scope" ("The
Rules of Professional Conduct...should be interpreted with reference to the
purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.")-but also in the black letter
rules themselves. See, e.g., Model Rule 3.2 ("A lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."); Model
Rule 3.5 (c) ("A lawyer shall not...engage in conduct intended to disrupt a
tribunal."); Model Rule 4.4 ([a] lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person....").
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of a law that directs our attention above and beyond itself, upon pain of
punishment here and now! 0
Incivility, like frivolity, presents legalistic reformers with the "know-
it-when-I-see-it" problem. What strikes us as uncivil varies with subtle
differences in tone, context, and intent that are difficult to capture in black-
letter rules, other than very vague rules of reason. Moreover, with respect
to incivility, there is a related paradox: the effort to give formerly informal,
extra-legal sanctions the force of law runs the risk of killing civility in order
to save it.
B. The Equitable Alternative.
This problem, legalism reaching its logical limits, gives rise to the
second remedy for declining professionalism, which I call the "equitable,"
as opposed to "legal," approach. Following an oscillation evident in other
areas of law,41 the professionalism crusade swings from reliance on sharp-
edged legal rules to a more or less frank default to "know-it-when-I-see-
it" standards that confer extensive discretion on the decision maker. Both
the bar's professionalism studies and scholarly articles are replete with
calls for this approach, sometimes joined with rather impatient sugges-
tions that this is an inherent job of the judiciary on which judges have
recently been slacking.42
40 This is evident, for example, in the burgeoning of Rule II satellite
litigation. Saul M. Kassin,Empirical Study ofRulell Sanctions(1985), conducted
under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center, found close to the maximum level
of statistical uncertainty in a wide range of hypothetical sanctioning cases submit-
ted to federal district judges.
41 Carol M. Rose, "Crystals and Mud in Property Law." 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 583-85 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication." 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
42 ABA Commission, supra note 2, at 42 (recommending more extensive use
of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and state analogues); Florida Commission,
supra note 3, at 29 ("Judges of the state and federal courts should be encouraged
to enforce the Standards of Professionalism."); Committee on Civility, supra note
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But here again, there are problems. Judges have evinced, and occa-
sionally expressed, reluctance to enter the lists, sometimes because they
are individually risky, especially where judges face elections and bar
polls, 43 sometimes because they are institutionally inappropriate, wasteful
of their time, beyond their expertise, or otherwise inappropriate.44 Behind
this reluctance may lie a more fundamental problem: Who judges the
judges, and in what terms, if the judges are by definition being asked to
apply ineffable standards? 45 Abusive judges exist, even if they do not
3, at 7 (noting calls of "[s]everal commentators [on an interim draft]...urging the
judiciary to assume a leadership role and serve as the principle example of
courtesy, dignified courtroom conduct, restraint, and tolerance...."); Dorsen &
Friedman, Disorder in the Court, supra note 21 (especially chapter 9, "The
Responsibility of Judges," and chapter 10, "The Contempt Power"); Clarke,
"Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum," supra note 3 ("Etiquette Breaches,
Contempt of Court, and Judges' Discretion to Decide").
43 See ABA Commission, supra note 2, at 44 ("[Jludges are far less likely to
punish misconduct and take other tough action if they must run for re-election or
retention every few years."); Florida Commission, supra note 3, at 23 ("[M]any
judges are uncomfortable in the role of disciplinarian....").
44 See Robert E. Keeton, "Times are Changing for Trials in Court." 21 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993) ("I believe judges in general have neither the time, the
resources, nor the will to undertake this responsibility" i.e., "to control and punish
hardball lawyers"); Clarke, "Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum," supra note
3, at 954 (with some notable examples of impatience like the Dondi case, "Courts
generally are reluctant to impose formal rules of courtroom conduct.") This
reluctance seems evident, also, in the judiciary's reluctance to expand Rule I I's
scope from "gate-keeping"--screening out frivolous claims-to "ethical polic-
ing"-monitoring a wider range of sanctionable misconduct. See Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); See Rhode &
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 14.
45 See Illinois Prof. Com. Report, Recommendation No. 34, supra note 3, at
450-51 "Frivolous Lawsuits, Committee Comment" ("Because the respective
state and federal rules potentially give the courts deleterious powerof intimidation,
the committee recommends an empirical study of the rules.... Absent such a study,
immeasurable damage could result in the court's expansive use of sanctions
against alleged frivolous conduct.").
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abound.46 And there would be variation even among conscientious judges,
as the history of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 amply demonstrates. 47
Equity, remember, is notorious for varying with the chancellor's foot.
C. Non-binding Self Regulation.
So where are we, if hard legal rules will not work, and squishy
equitable standards will not work either? We are at the threshold of the
professionalism crusade. This is the professional equivalent of a religious
revival, relying on legally non-binding "self' regulation-codes, creeds,
and pledges of professionalism-to supplement the existing regulatory
framework of binding disciplinary rules and restore an informally en-
forced professional community.
This new approach has much to commend it. On the one hand, it
recognizes, if only implicitly and imperfectly, the limits of the command-
and-control approach to professional reform. On the other hand, it offers
the promise, though not yet the product, of avoiding the bar's all too
familiar resort to platitudes and preachments. It offers, in its place,
evidence of an effort to re-build the kind of professional community on
which enforcement of informal sanctions depends. There are, however,
46 Dorsen & Friedman, Disorder in the Court, supra note 21, at 199-205,233-
38; Clarke, "Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum," supra note 3, at 945,
1004ff. ("Breaches of Etiquette by Judges").
47 See Lawrence C. Marshall etal., "The Use and Impact of Rule 11." 86 NW.
U. L. REV. 943,965-75 (1992) (identifying its application as uneven); William W.
Schwarzer, "Rule 11 Revisited." 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (1988) ("Al-
though the standard that governs attorneys' conduct is objective reasonableness,
what ajudge will find to be objectively unreasonable is very much a matter of that
judge's subjective determination."); Kassin, Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions
45, supra note 40 ("IThere is a good deal of interjudge disagreement over what
actions constitute a violation of the rule....").
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serious problems with the emerging approach; it is to these that we must
now turn.
IV. The Fallacy of the One True Way.
The major problem is what I call the fallacy of the one true way, the
implicit-and demonstrably erroneous-premise that conscientious law-
yers agree on the way to be a good person and a good lawyer, or that a single
kind of lawyering is right and all others wrong. This flawed premise
undermines all the various ways suggested for promoting the values of
professionalism: Before we can teach professionalism, or reward it or
punish it or make people promise to do it, we have to get clear on what "it"
is. To better get at why we are not clear on what it is, I want to examine a
tripartite taxonomy of lawyers. Each type fits quite comfortably within the
law, and each has both scholarly defenders and practicing exemplars. Yet
each incorporates a very different vision of the lawyer's professional
obligations.
There is, of course, nothing inherently sacred about the number three.
Robert Nozick, best known outside academic philosophy for his Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, gives a wonderful warning about why theorists do not
use two- or four-part classifications:
Dyadic classifications...have less interest, while quadratic
ones apparently are too complicated for most people to keep in
mind, which is why there is no holy Quadrinity.48
With that warning, on to my rather unholy trinity of lawyer types.
48 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 557 n.* (1981).
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A. A Taxonomy of (Arguably) Legitimate Modes of Lawyering.
1. The Neutral Partisan (or the Hired Gun).
The first type is known in scholarly circles as the neutral partisan. 49
This type is also known, more popularly, as the hired gun,50 and, more
recently, as "Rambo."5' The basic operating premise here is that anything
a lawyer does for a client within the strict letter of the law, whether
procedural or substantive, is at least morally and professionally OK, and
perhaps even laudable; a lawyer may (or perhaps should) use any legally
permitted means to assist any client to achieve any arguably legal end.
This model of lawyering, which has ancient roots, has three basic
modem justifications. It is sometimes said to be an inevitable corollary of
the adversarial system, which is itself defended as the best means of
49 See Rhode & Luban,LegalEthics, supra note 14, at 132; Deborah L. Rhode,
"Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice." 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,605 (1985). This
position is also described as the lawyer's amoral ethical role, see Stephen L.
Pepper, "The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities." 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613; the traditional conception, see
Charles Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation." 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1061 (1976); the standard conception, see
David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study xix (1988); the full advocacy
model, see Alan H. Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics 92
(1980); and the libertarian approach, see William H. Simon, "Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering." 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,1084-85 (1988), Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics. I follow Rhode and
Luban's choice of terms to emphasize the two key elements of this model and the
fact that this model is not the only option available to lawyers in our culture. Rhode
& Luban, supra note 14, at 132-33.
50 See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 10.3.1 (1986)(noting
ambivalence of lawyers toward the term, some associating it with "servile acts of
immorality and lawlessness"; others with "the macho heroics of the frontier").
51 See, e.g., Committee on Civility, supra note 3, at 6 (criticizing "'Rambo'-
style discovery").
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discovering truth and protecting individual rights.52 More recently, it has
been defended as analogous to personal friendship. Just as friends may
legitimately act on behalf of friends in ways that would not be appropriate
on behalf of strangers, the argument runs, so lawyers may assist clients in
accomplishing legal but immoral ends, since lawyers are their clients'
"special purpose friends" in such matters.5 3 Finally, neutral partisan
lawyering is said to be justified as a necessary means for clients to exercise
their rights within the law. Without lawyers, clients could not discover the
sphere of autonomy reserved to them by law in a complex modem state.
Indeed, if lawyers were to decline on moral grounds to help clients exercise
that legally defined autonomy, they would to that extent be usurping the
function of the law itself in setting the bounds of appropriate individual
conduct. 54
Scholars have criticized each of these defenses of neutral partisan-
ship-as a corollary of the adversarial system,55 as an analogue of
friendship,56 and as a necessary means to individual autonomy 57-
52 See Monroe H. Freedman, "Judge Frankel's Search for Truth." 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1060 (1975).
53 See Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation," supra note 49.
54 See Pepper, "The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities," supra note 49.
55 David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 50-103 (1988); David Luban, "The
Adversary System Excuse." In The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers'
Ethics 83 (David Luban ed., 1984); Thomas L. Shaffer, "The Unique, Novel, and
Unsound Adversary Ethic." 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988).
56 Susan Wolf, "Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law." In The Good
Lawyer 38,59 n.4, supra note 55; Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 49,
at 108-09; Rhode & Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 14, at 151-53; Edward A
Dauer & Arthur A. Leff, "Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend." 86 YALE L.J.
573; Sanford Levinson, "Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friend-
ship." 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 639-40.
57 David Luban, "The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen
Pepper." 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637.
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severely and, I think, compellingly. But-and this is a significant point-
conscientious people could nonetheless think otherwise. Indeed, one of the
critical failings of the present crusade is to overlook those whom I will
describe as conscientious type 1 lawyers.
Theoretical critiques of Type 1 lawyering are fairly new, and the
elaboration of alternative models, newer still. As the untenability of the
Type I position and the availability of viable alternatives become more
widely known among practicing lawyers, adherence to the Type 1 model
may well diminish. Type 1 behavior, however, is likely to persist for other,
less laudable reasons than the lag time of its criticism's dissemination. At
the risk of approaching the ad hominem, it must be pointed out that Type
1 lawyering offers its adherents a most attractive view of the world, if not
a lawyers' Shangri-La. Its fundamental message, after all, is that whatever
a lawyer does for a client within the letter of the law is virtuous, however
much it may violate the moral rights of third parties or the interests of the
public at large. From this perspective, the trying moral dilemmas of law
practice simply disappear; the lawyer's professional role is explicitly
defended as amoral. This, perhaps, gives its theoretical defenses a psycho-
logical appeal out of proportion to their abstract merits, even in the minds
of the conscientious. Forgive George Eliot, if not me, for observing that
"the egoism which enters into our theories does not affect their sincerity;
rather, the more our egoism is satisfied, the more robust is our belief."58
Finally, even I must be forgiven for pointing out the obvious: not all
lawyers are conscientious. Some, one suspects, are looking for rationaliza-
tions, not reasons, for their anti-social conduct; others are no doubt happy
to operate up to the margins of legality without any excuse, conscientious
or contrived. Among the latter, we can expect to find not just stretching the
borders of the law, but also self-serving transgressions of ordinary civility.
Lawyers of this ilk may not justify their Type 1 behavior by even a self-
58 George Eliot, 2 Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life 83 (Everyman's
Library ed., 1991).
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serving reference to dubious theories; they may feel no need to justify it at
all. They are what I call unscrupulous Type 1 lawyers.
Consider a few illustrations of the Type 1 lawyer. In fiction the
paradigm is Polly Biegler, in Robert Traver's Anatomy of a Murder
(played by Jimmy Stewart in the movie version). He was the defense
counsel who pressed the edge of subornation of perjury to suggest to his
client a dubious but successful insanity defense to murder. In fact, the
pantheon is crowded, but the archetype is perhaps Bruce Bromley, a
litigation partner with Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, who was noted for his
dilatory tactics in major antitrust suits.59 Here is how Bromley described
himself and his methods in a 1958 speech to a conference of judges:
Now I was born, I think, to be a protractor....I quickly realized
in my early days at the bar that I could take the simplest antitrust
case that Judge Hansen could think of and protract it for the defense
almost to infinity. ...Promptly after the answer was filed I served
quite a comprehensive set of interrogatories on the Government. I
said to myself, "That'll tie up brother Hansen for a while," and I
went about other business. 60
There is today a chair honoring Bromley at the Harvard Law Schoo161-
59 See Philip M. Stem, Lawyers on Trial, 151-52 (1980) ("When it comes to
legal delaying maneuvers, one of the kings (in all likelihood the self-proclaimed
king) was the late Bruce Bromley....To Bromley, the delaying game was precisely
that-a game-and not one to be in the least ashamed of. On the contrary, it was
a skill to be proud of, to boast of publicly....").
60 Bruce Bromley, "Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases." 23 F.R.D. 417,420
(1958).
61 American Association of Law Schools, Directory of Law Teachers: 1993-
94 at 60. Cf. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism, supra note 4, at 1165
(expressing hope that everyone now recognizes Bromleyan tactics as profession-
ally improper).
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
testimony to the appeal of this model, or to the availability of secular
indulgences.
2. The Officer of the Court (or Law's Acolyte).
Type 2 lawyers see themselves as "officers of the court"; their
detractors see them as quasi-bureaucrats or as aspiring acolytes in the
temple of justice. 62 The central belief of the Type 2 lawyer is this:
Normative limits narrower than the letter of the law sometimes constrain
what a lawyer may properly do for a client; a lawyer should properly
decline to assist clients in achieving some ends, by some means, even
though these are strictly legal, if they violate other identifiable public
norms.
63
So, for example, the Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar says "I will
not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me
to be unjust.... I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided tome such means only as are consistent with truth and honor.... 64
Ends are to be measured against justice, not the letter of the law alone;
means against truth and honor, not mere legality.
Like the Type 1 model, Type 2 is not monolithic. Differences in the
theoretical basis of Type 2 lawyering matter more for our purposes than
those of Type 1, because the different theoretical underpinnings give rise
to different ranges of permissible conduct. We must, accordingly, distin-
62 Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 49, at 61-67 ("the lawyer as
para-bureaucrat"), 91-94 ("the lawyer as acolyte").63 William Simon urges that lawyers be guided by the spirit of the law, see
Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering." 101 HARV L. REV. 1083 (1988);
David Luban points them to ordinary morality, see David Luban, Lawyers and
Justice (1988), supra note 55.
64 Supreme Court of Florida, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar 275 (D & S
1987).
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guish two primary subclasses in this regard, Type 2 proceduralists and
Type 2 substantivists.
Type 2 proceduralists find limits short of the letter of the law as to
procedure, but not as to substance.65 In general, they believe that lawyers
should use procedural laws--rules of evidence and practice, for ex-
ample-according to their purpose, which is to resolve issues fairly and
expeditiously on their merits. As to substance, on the other hand, they
believe it is the job of the tribunal, not the lawyer, to decide what the
purpose of the law is. They would, in other words, press any non-frivolous
claim, irrespective of their private opinion as to its merits, and leave the
substantive decision on the merits entirely to the finder of fact or law. In
that respect, Type 2 proceduralists are indistinguishable from conscien-
tious Type 1 lawyers.
Type 2 substantivists, on the other hand, believe that the lawyer is
constrained by "public" limits short of the letter of substantive as well as
procedural law. Substantivists would, accordingly, decline to bring non-
frivolous claims that did not also meet other, more restrictive, criteria.
These additional criteria are to be found in the spirit or purpose of the law6
or in the dictates of ordinary morality.67 Stated most generally, the lawyer
is to pursue justice, not just legally permissible outcomes. In more
sophisticated versions of the substantivist Type 2 model, substance and
procedure are subtly coordinated. Thus, where the procedural mechanisms
can be depended on to ensure a fair adversarial presentation of differing
positions on the merits, and where the tribunal is an appropriate one for
65 The paradigm of this position is Lon L. Fuller and John D. Randall,
"Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference." 44 ABA 1. 1159,
1161 (1958).
66 Simon, "Ethical Discretion," supra note 63.
67 Luban, "Lysistratian Prerogative," supra note 57; Lawyers and Justice,
supra note 55.
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making such decisions, then the lawyer can take more dubious substantive
positions and can press them more aggressively than would otherwise be
the case.68
The paradigm Type 2 lawyer is Louis Brandeis, playing two roles he
created for himself, "lawyer for the situation" and "the people's lawyer."
In the former role, Brandeis tried to bring antagonistic private parties
together on mutually beneficial accommodations. 69 In the latter role,
Brandeis tried to temper his representation of the emerging corporate
giants of his day with concern for the under-represented interest of the
public at large.70 This is the vision the bar generally holds up to its
members, and it is the vision toward which most lawyers aspire, at least in
their more beatific moods.
3. The Moral Individualist (or Lawyer Vigilante).
The third type of lawyer I call the moral individualist; my students
prefer the term "lawyer vigilante." The basic operating premise here is that
lawyers may violate the spirit of both substantive and procedural law (e.g.,
to exploit loopholes) so long as they do not transgress the law's letter, and
as long as they are laboring in a good cause, by their own lights. Lawyers
may, indeed should, pursue justicebut, in contrastto Type 2s, by their own
lights, not by any set of shared public norms like the spirit of the law or
ordinary morality. This permits lawyers to pursue any legal ends that they
believe to be morally right, by any means that meet the same criteria.7 '
In this category, as in Types 1 and 2, we must note an important
subdivision. Some Type 3 lawyers seek to work within the context of
liberal legalism, stretching the law's outer bounds for the advantage of
particular clients, without meaning to subvert the legal system as a
68 Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 63.
69 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, supra note 50, § 13.6 at 730.
70 Louis D. Brandeis, Business:A Profession 329-43 (Hale, Cushman & Flint
1933) (1914); David Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 55 at 169-74.
71 For a defense of this model, see Rob Atkinson, "Beyond the New Role
Morality for Lawyers." 52 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992).
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whole.72 Others, by contrast, oppose liberal legalism itself. They seek to
exploit the play in its joints to cripple or kill what they think is a beastly
system. Here we reach the ultimate paradox-for the latter Type 3 lawyers,
the processes that constitute liberal legalism are to be used as the means of
delegitimating and eventually overthrowing the system as a whole.
For fictional examples of this type, think of Portia, in Shakespeare's
Merchant of Venice, defending her lover's friend from forfeiture of "a
pound of flesh nearest the heart." It hardly troubles her to prevail by
arguing for a judicial construction of that phrase not contemplated by
either contracting party, even if that means denying Shylock his legal
due.73 For nonfiction exemplars, think of Clarence Darrow, in his wither-
ing and humiliating Scopes trial cross examination of William Jennings
Bryan. But also bear in mind more ambiguous role models like William
72 This may seem, on first face, to violate the widely (though not universally)
accepted principle of universalizability as a criterion of moral conduct. In its
classic formulation, Kant's categorical imperative, one should act only according
to that maxim which one could at the same time will that it should be a universal
law. The problem here is that, if all lawyers pressed all clients' ends as aggressively
as the Type 3 lawyers press theirs, severe systemic harm, if not gridlock, would
result. The response of conscientious Type 1 lawyers, of course, is to deny the
conclusion and to insist that social good, rather than harm, will result. The response
of Type 3 lawyers is to narrow the principle's practical scope while preserving its
universalized form, along these lines: All lawyers should press aggressively only
the claims of those clients who are especially needy, threatened, or deserving. The
paradigm of such clients is the indigent criminal defendant, a hard-pressed
individual facing the vast resources of the state at risk of losing the most cherished
human values, liberty and life.
73 Portia might also plausibly be characterized as a Type 2 substantivist, on
the view that she thought the liquidated damages clause was unconscionable as a
matter of law, see Simon, "Ethical Discretion," supra note 63, or that she believed
such an award would violate not merely her own profound personal affection for
the victim, but also the dictates of ordinary morality in such matters. See Luban,
Lawyers and Justice, supra note 55. It is these distinctions, not the characterization
of a particular case, that concern us here.
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Kunstler of the Chicago Seven trial, who purports to "only defend those I
love"74 and who has no love lost for liberal legalism.
B. Illustration of the Lawyer Types.
To recapitulate the three lawyer types, they are the Type 1, the neutral
partisan or hired gun, who goes full bore for any client or cause; the Type
2, the officer of the court, or acolyte of the law, who tries to moderate all
private representations with an infusion of public values; and the Type 3,
the moral individualist or lawyer vigilante, who goes full bore, but only for
virtuous clients and causes, personally and perhaps idiosyncratically
defined. To get clearer on these three breeds of lawyering and their
respective subspecies, let us put them through their paces in an extended
example.
The case involves wetlands development. These are the background
facts: A developer wants to dredge and fill partof an ecologically sensitive
wetland and put in high-rise condominiums. (My senior colleagues tell me
that this used to happen occasionally in the state of Florida.) Opposing the
development is a local, underfunded environmental group. The state's
permitting agency is overworked and understaffed; the outcome will
depend very much on the cases made by the parties.
Let us consider the conduct of the three types of lawyers at various
points in the proceedings, beginning with the initial interview, in which the
prospective clients present their positions and on the basis of which the
lawyer will decide whether to take the case. The Type 1 lawyer will most
likely wind up representing the developer, and will go full bore at all
phases, by all means, irrespective of the merits of the project in his or her
private opinion. He or she may tell us that this is because every legal
viewpoint deserves a good lawyer and, if a conscientious Type 1, may cite
74 Auerbach, Unequal Justice, supra note 21, at 290.
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scholarly articles on the point.75 For the unscrupulous, on the other hand,
the prospect of a tidy fee will more than compensate for short-changing
high theory.
The Type 3 lawyer, at the other pole, will most likely be found
representing the environmental group. The critical point to note is that
what he or she does for the environmental group will not differ much from
what the Type 1 does for the developer-it will be a ruthless, no-holds-
barred representation. But he or she will claim to be motivated by belief
in the cause. And we have pretty good evidence of sincerity here-clients
like this do not tend to pay top dollar.
That brings us to the Type 2 lawyer, the more complex and interesting
case. At the very outset, the Type 2 may decline the representation
altogether, on grounds of public policy or personal morality. And he or she
may decline either side for those reasons. Money will not be everything
here, as it is for the unscrupulous Type 1, or nothing, as it is for the Type
3. Conversely, belief in the substantive justice of the client's case will not
be everything, as it is for the Type 3s, or nothing, as it is for the Type Is,
both conscientious and unscrupulous. Rather, money and the merits will
both be relevant factors. The Type 2 lawyer is painfully aware that if you
are too scrupulous in turning down distasteful clients, you simply will not
have enough paying clients to sustain a private practice.
Thus, instead of turning down the developers in this case, the Type 2
lawyer is more likely to try to persuade them to do better, or less bad, and
to dress up that recommendation in terms that will be meaningful to such
a client: public image, community outrage, costly legal battles, and the
like.76 And this will be especially true in the early, advisory phases of
75 Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend," supra note 49; Pepper, "The Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role," supra note 49.76 Fuller& Randall, "Professional Responsibility: Report of theJoint Confer-
ence," supra note 65, at 1161. Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, Ethical
Consideration 7-8, n. 19 (citing Fuller and Randall).
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representation. The Type 2 lawyer will feel more comfortable taking the
client's position if the matter becomes adversarial, on the assumption that
competing interests will be similarly represented and that the court or
agency has a more direct mandate to achieve just outcomes.
Should the matter go into litigation, the Type 1 lawyer will use every
trick in the book. Procedurally, he or she will do anything to inflict cost in
terms of time and money and headaches on the other side, operating, for
example, up to the edge of sanctionable discovery abuse-recall Bromley's
protractor. Substantively, the fuzzy edges of Rule 1 l's frivolity standard
are the Type 1 lawyer's natural habitat. He or she might, for example, file
a dubious takings claim, to raise the now-dreaded prospect of retrospective
damages against the regulating body,77 or take intimidating steps against
the environmental group.78 He or she would routinely file Rule 11 claims
and disqualification motions against the other side. And he or she would
eagerly politicize the process, working press and public opinion without
a noticeable distaste for distortion and sensationalism, making dire predic-
tions of the collapse of the local economy if the tree-huggers have their
way.
The Type 3 lawyer's tactics would be virtually indistinguishable in
substance and in form. Motive, marked perhaps by a measure of sanctimo-
niousness, is the only real difference. If there is a snail darter, the Type 3s
will find it; even if there is not, and no one reasonably thinks there is, they
will file interminably for temporary restraining orders while a battery of
dubious experts fishes around, literally and figuratively. They will exer-
77 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
78 SeeJenniferE. Sills, "SLAPPS (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Partici-
pation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate their Appeal?" 25 CONN. L. REV.
547 (1993); John C. Barker, "Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the
Problem of SLAPPS." 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395 (1993); George W. Pring &
Penelope Canan, "'Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation' ('SLAPPS'):
An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders." 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937
(1992).
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cise their constitutional right to inform the public, through the press, about
the impending environmental apocalypse about to be wrought by the
opposing party.
What about the Type 2s? In the adversarial process itself, they will
tend to rely more on the system to produce the right result, taking care not
to abuse the process. Once the matter is in litigation, Type 2 proceduralists
will eschew obstructionist tactics but otherwise put their client's case in
the best possible light, even if they doubt its merits, leaving that decision
to the court. Thus, for example, if an opponent's request for a stipulation
or continuance is reasonable and will not seriously disadvantage the
proceduralist's client, Type 2s will go along, or at least urge the client to
go along.79 Beyond that, Type 2 substantivists will accept a measure of
direct responsibility for the outcome as well as the fairness of the process
by which it is reached. In more sophisticated versions, they will adjust their
level of zeal to the adequacy of the other side's representation.8 0
The final aspect of the example I want to focus on is the general tone
of the representation, through all its phases, as seen in the routine
interaction with other counsel, other parties, and the court, with respect to
such things as requests for extensions and stipulations, returning phone
calls, and keeping appointments, conduct generally grouped under the
heading of civility. It is important to note that attitudes toward civility are
not perfectly correlated with the lawyer types. Conscientious Type 1
lawyers, for all their tactical ferocity, may well eschew incivility, at least
in their more visible public dealings. The reason may be either aconsci-
entious commitment to civility as such or an effort to cultivate the
mystique of elite gentility, the velvet-covered fist. Unscrupulous Type I
lawyers, on the other hand, may well take the opposite tack, cultivating a
79 See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-
101(A)(1) (a lawyer does not violate the duty of zealously representing a client "by
acceding to reasonable requests to opposing counsel which do not prejudice the
rights of his client...").80 Simon, "Ethical Discretion," supra note 50.
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reputation for incivility, both for the publicity in general and for the
particular thing publicized, a devil-may-care attitude toward all but the
client. A reputation for toughness, even rudeness, may well be prized, as
it is, for example, among debt collection agencies. Hassles and headaches
are, on this view, just another way of wearing down the opposition.
Type 2 lawyers, committed as they all are to orderly legal processes,
will tend to be committed to an overall tone of civility as well. For them
civility is likely to trade as a value independent of its effect in particular
clients' cases.8' The Type 3 lawyer's attitude toward civility is most
difficult to generalize. They are more likely to view it as a means toward
client ends, rather than as an independent value or a means toward ends
beyond those of their clients. If it helps a good client, fine; if its absence
hurts a bad opponent, also fine. Among subversives, incivility may be part
of their general destabilizing plan. Conversely, civility may be the sheep's
clothing in which they try to disguise wolverine or vulpine objectives.
Finally-and this is significant--even lawyers generally committed
to civility may operate under only a rebuttable presumption of mutual co-
operation, contingent upon the other side's reciprocating. Sometimes
enough will be enough. When the environmental group, for example, files
to have algae declared an endangered species, it will be time to call them
obstructionists (if not pond scum) and to use a tone of voice not commonly
heard on Sesame Street.
The point of the lawyer trilogy and the illustrative case is this: We all
find aspects of each of the lawyer types tolerable, if not admirable. This is
not because we are not quite sure what we want, individually or collec-
tively. What we want is more complex than the paradise of lost innocence
that the professionalism crusade promises to regain. The next section tries
to clarify, though I am afraid not simplify, what it is that we want. Against
that background, the final section discusses why the present crusade
cannot satisfy us and how we might reform it.
81 See, e.g., Model Code, Ethical Considerations 7-37 and 7-38 (urging
civility toward, and cooperation with, tribunals and opposing counsel).
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V. Failings of the Professionalism Crusade.
Most of us think of ourselves as, or recognize important aspects of
ourselves in, theType 2 lawyer, the "officer of thecourt." Most of us rather
prefer that role, seeing ourselves as seeking just outcomes through civil
means. But at the same time, most of us at least begrudgingly admire
fanaticism for a cause, or are willing to tolerate it within the bounds of law,
even though we dislike fanaticism for hire. It is one thing to join the
mujahadeen in the mountains; it is quite another to hire out as a mercenary.
That is the seductive appeal of Barry Goldwater's slogan: "Extremism in
the defense of liberty is no vice. And...moderation in the pursuit ofjustice
is no virtue."82
There is a related point here: Even though we do not want to be, or
cannot afford to be, fanatics, we accept the need and thus the justification
for occasionally acting fanatically. Most of us believe in fighting fire with
fire, or at least in returning fire when fired upon, even if we do not believe
in scorched-earth tactics as a matter of first resort in any cause, however
just.
That is why, I think, we accept, even applaud, Atticus Finch's
aggressive trial tactics in To Killa Mockingbird, where he defended a black
man falsely accused of rape by the daughter of the town derelict. On the
one hand, Atticus destroyed the young woman's credibility by showing
how she had tried to seduce the defendant. Though we are moved by her
tears, we hardly fault Atticus for his remorselessness in the way that we
would had she been innocent. Nor are we troubled that Atticus established
the guilt of the real culprit, her father, through crafty cross-examination
that entrapped him in his own class resentment. When he leaves the witness
stand fuming that "Tricking lawyers like Atticus Finch took advantage of
82 John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 341 n.l (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.,
Little, Brown and Co. 1992).
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him all the time with their tricking ways,"83 he takes little of our sympathy
with him.
Let me give you another example, a bit closer to home. Fifteen years
ago pretty much to this day, I came across the Creek as an undergraduate
senior to hear Geoffrey Hazard, of the law school for which I was soon to
be bound, deliver a lecture-a lecture in this series, as well as I recall. I do
not have the vaguest notion now what his topic was. But I will never forget
something that happened in the question and answer session that followed.
The first question came from a senior professor and high administration
official known, at least among us undergraduates, for his arrogance and
pomposity. The content of his question, like that of Hazard's talk, has long
escaped me, but the tone was typically arrogant and pompous. As he spoke,
I remember thinking, "that's not how a representative of Washington &
Lee should address a guest." But before that thought quite congealed in my
mind, Hazard answered, like a thunderbolt. In the undergraduate idiom of
that time, Hazard blew him away. In a single brilliant sentence, Hazard
illuminated and incinerated his interlocutor's glib arrogance. No one there
that day, I would wager against heavy odds, thought that Hazard was out
of line or, to use the shibboleth of the professionalism crusade, uncivil. I
was reminded of Hazard when I read one of M. Scott Peck's hallmarks of
civility: Never hurting another person's feelings-without meaning to.84
And, most of us would add, except in a good cause.
The professionalism crusade, unfortunately, fails to acknowledge
either the multiplicity of conscientious models of lawyering or the context-
sensitive nature of civility. With respect to civility, the crusade oversim-
plifies by categorically condemning all "harsh" conduct, all less than
pleasant social exchanges. It calls for us all to act like Mr. Rogers even
83 Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird 180 (Popular Library ed. 1962) (1 st ed.
1960).
84 M. Scott Peck, A World Waiting to Be Born: Civility Rediscovered 4-5
(1993).
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though we clearly are not living in his Neighborhood. Thus, according to
the Creed of Professionalism of the Florida Bar, "I will abstain from all
rude, disruptive, disrespectful, and abusive behavior and will at all times
act with dignity, decency, and courtesy."
There are several problems with this unqualified endorsement of what
seems to be a kind of Senatorial courtesy. In the first place, insistence on
courtesy and decorum have occasionally worked against legitimate de-
mands for structural reform as, for example, in the civil rights movement.85
Second, and more generally, even the nicest notions of good manners do
not dictate universal pleasanmess. By at least implying otherwise, the
crusade tends to limit the flexibility of the mannerly among us to respond
in contextually appropriate ways to the rudeness of others. It calls for
unilateral disarmament when surgical strikes seem more appropriate.
Second, the crusade disappoints-I would even say disturbs-in its
failure to acknowledge the various competing visions of ethical lawyering.
The professionalism crusade, with its creeds and codes and pledges, tends
to present itself as the one true way, condemning alternative visions as
heretical. Even more problematically, it seeks to become the Established
Church. This is especially true where the crusade is taken up by integrated,
non-voluntary bar associations and by the courts. It is one thing to be
denounced as a heretic by the ABA or the College of Probate Counsel; it
is quite another to be denounced by the Florida Bar or the Virginia Bar86
or the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In the case of the former,
voluntary groups like the ABA, the worst they can do is excommunicate
you. You can join a new denomination-the National Lawyers' Guild, for
example-or start up one of your own. Mandatory state bar associations
and the courts, on the other hand, have the power to bum you at the stake,
to strip you of your livelihood and even to put you in jail.
85 William H. Chafe, Civility and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina
and the Black Struggle for Freedom 8-10 (1980).
86 See Rules of Supreme Ct. of Va., PT. SIX (Integration of the State Bar
(1993)).
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VI. Redeeming the Professionalism Crusade.87
The professionalism crusade is not, however, without redeeming
social value. It is to be congratulated for underscoring problems, particu-
larly excessive zeal and incivility, that threaten the core values of liberal
legalism. And it rightly evinces a growing skepticism about the propriety
and capability of coercive legal measures to redress those problems.
Finally, it admirably aims at infra-structural reforms and communal
edification that are both more radical and more consistent with an appre-
ciation of the ultimate foundations of the liberal legalism it is devoted to
preserving. All these positive elements can be preserved, however, while
the movement is purged of the problems I have identified.
In terms of content, the crusade can easily abandon its categorical
approach to the central problems of incivility and frivolity in favor of the
kind of flexibility I have urged. With respect to the former, it could
acknowledge that sometimes it is appropriate for lawyers to turn the other
cheek; sometimes, to braid a whip and drive the money-changers from the
temple (metaphorically, of course). Interestingly, this perspective is in-
cluded in the Oath of Admission to the Florida Bar, which antedates the
present crusade by a good fifty years. The basic oath sounds very much like
the professionalism crusade: "I will abstain from all offensive personality
and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness...." 88 But in the very next clause, the other shoe falls: "unless
required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged." 89
87 Here again, the religious imagery is not original with me. See Gordon and
Simon, supra note 15.
88 Supreme Court of Florida, RulesRegulating the Florida Bar, supra note 64,
at 275. See also Model Code, Ethical Consideration 7-37 ("A lawyer should not
make unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel.")
89 See Supreme Court of Florida, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, supra
note 64, at 275.
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With respect to frivolity, the crusade could recognize that conscien-
tious lawyers differ on the circumstances under which it is appropriate to
press the bounds of existing law on behalf of clients, and that identifying
the conscientious lawyer is a dangerous job to delegate to organs of the
state. This recognition, in turn, would allow the crusade to narrow the
excessive scope of its claims. In particular, the crusade could abandon its
claim to being the one true way, and its tendency to rely on the state to
enforce that way. This would have distinct effects on the role of bar
organizations, the courts, and the law schools with respect to the crusade.
A. Bar Associations.
The role of bar associations would depend on their type. Mandatory
bar associations, the unified bars that now exist in many states, would
ideally disappear in favor of the more typical forms of profession regula-
tion by state agencies. 90 Alternatively, mandatory bars might limit their
functions to imposing and enforcing the kinds of minimum standards
found in the disciplinary rules of the 1969 Model Code and in the 1983
Model Rules. These would operate, as originally conceived, as the mini-
mum obligations of a lawyer, a kind of lowest common denominator
required to administer justice and overcome information asymmetries and
other imperfections in the market for professional services.
Unified bars might supplement this maintenance of minimum order
by encouraging discussion of other, more debatable issues such as those
I have identified as professionalism in the narrow sense. There is some
evidence of this already, if only by default, in the bar's sponsorship of
professionalism and civility studies and task forces and its tendency to
90 See Theodore J. Schneyer, "The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept:
Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case." 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (calling
for elimination of unified bars in favor of private voluntary bars and public
administrative agencies).
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promulgate creeds as "guides" or "discussion drafts" rather than as the
basis for sanction or requirements of membership.9'
Voluntary bar associations, by contrast, could appropriately under-
take a much more active role in promoting the shared values of their
members, including those of the professionalism crusade. This greater role
is appropriate to such organizations because the element of conscience-
coercion is absent here; any lawyer who does not like the organization's
vision of professionalism can leave or be expelled without loss of license
to practice law. Such organizations could be more or less broad in their
scope. Some, like the ABA and its state affiliates, could continue to operate
as umbrella organizations for a wide range of lawyers holding quite
divergent visions of the lawyer's role, but an essential commitment to the
basic vision of liberal legalism. Other organizations might require adher-
ence to much narrower or more rigorous understandings of professional
obligation. These could exist within more latitudinarian groups like the
ABA, as separate orders and fellowships exist in the Anglican and Roman
Catholic communions, or as separate, unaffiliated entities, like the de-
nominations and branches of Protestantism and Judaism.
The approach I am suggesting would leave to voluntary lawyers'
groups the job of spelling out detailed credal statements for their members,
not for the entire bar. This would be analogous to the way in which the
various denominations, under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
formulate and regulate the beliefs and practices of their members without
state aid or interference. Here the crusade has its proper place, and might
do some real good. It might bring like-minded lawyers together, for mutual
support and correction, for value clarification and elaboration and promo-
tion.92 And it might give the public a clearer view of the range of lawyer
types available.
91 See ABA Creed and Pledge of Professionalism, pmbl.
92 Gordon & Simon, "The Redemption of Professionalism?" supra note 15,
at 245-47; Rob Atkinson, supra note 71, at 964-79.
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B. The Courts.
For their part, the courts should continue, perhaps even redouble, their
present efforts to maintain minimum order, to ensure the administration of
justice. To that end, they should employ the full range of their powers,
including both civil and criminal contempt. They should be careful,
however, in their efforts to police both frivolous litigation and incivility,
given the intrinsic limitations we have identified in the use of both bright-
line legal rules and broad equitable discretion in addressing those prob-
lems. They should, in particular, be wary of using highly coercive penalties
in view of the dangers of chilling vigorous advocacy and the difficulties
of distinguishing conscientious activism from ill-motivated aggression.
Indeed, to the maximum extent consistent with the need to avert the
obstruction ofjustice, they should forebear harshly sanctioning the activi-
ties and attitudes of conscientious dissenters, whether of Type 1 or Type 3.
This counsel of caution need not, however, leave judges on the
sidelines of the quest fora more nearly optimal professional order. It leaves
open to them an important monitoring and admonishing role, with respect
to two important constituencies. The first and most obvious of these
constituencies is lawyers. Without resort to the more coercive measures
available to them, the contempt power, and their inherent authority to
discipline lawyers practicing before them, judges can assume the task of
educating lawyers, especially younger lawyers, in fulfilling the elusive
role of "officer of the court." They can inform lawyers when, in their
judgment, lawyers present arguments bordering on the frivolous or engage
in conduct at the edge of civility.
This kind of informal admonition, of course, will not restrain the truly
recalcitrant, much less the revolutionary. It may well, however, both rein
in and edify conscientious lawyers of all types who acknowledge some
form of extra-legal limits on their lawyerly zeal and who need help in the
complex, context-sensitive issues of drawing the line. Again, with particu-
lar reference to younger lawyers, judges may need only to point out the
long-term harms of a particular course of conduct and the acceptability of
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alternative models of lawyering. It is one thing to read about the dubious
theoretical foundations of Type 1 lawyering in a law review article; it is
rather another to hear them articulated in open court or in chambers by a
sitting judge.
The judges' other constituents are litigants themselves, the lawyers'
clients. In an increasing range of matters,judges are collectively taking the
initiative to go over the heads of lawyers to speak directly to their clients,
initially to protect the client from the lawyer, but now sometimes to protect
the interests of both particular third parties and society more generally. 93
Clients are, after all, to determine within the law not only the ends their
lawyers pursue, but also the means by which they pursue them. 94 As a
moral matter, clients are entitled to hear from responsible public officials
that some ends and means, though legally available, are too publicly
damaging to be appropriately pursued by responsible citizens. It is a
profound, if only implicit, insult to citizens' integrity to assume that, when
informed of these harms, they will not conscientiously weigh interests of
the public and other private parties against their own. More appropriately,
judges should invite clients to accept responsibility as citizens for restrain-
ing the kinds of lawyerly excesses that are, for reasons we have identified,
immune from effective public policing.
C. The Law Schools.
A recurrent theme in the professionalism crusade is the need for law
schools to inculcate the virtues of professionalism. This call, however, not
93 See Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in Matrimonial Actions,
Report to the ChiefJudge ofthe State ofNew York 6 (May 4,1993) (recommending
that New York courts provide matrimonial litigants with a "Statement of Client's
Rights and Responsibilities").
94 See Model Rule 1.2, Comment, Scope of Representation ("In questions of
means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical
issues, but should defer to the client regarding such questions as...concern for third
parties who might be adversely affected.").
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only tends to overlook the variety of ways currently seen as reflecting
conscientious though divergent views of lawyering, it also, and more
fundamentally, tends to ignore a fundamental commitment of liberal
education, neutrality toward the widest possible range of viewpoints. The
point of liberal education is not to insist that any one set of outcomes or
social orderings, even liberalism itself, is "right" or "good." Rather, its
point is to foster critical examination of the premises and articulations of
all systems, itself included, secure in the faith that, in a free marketplace
of ideas, its own ideals will thrive.
There is, however, a way for legal educators, consistent with this
tradition, to play a vital role in reviving and sustaining the values of the
professionalism crusade. This role involves both the substance of what
they teach and, perhaps more important, the methods by which they teach.
With respect to substance, professors should, in fidelity to the tradition of
liberal education, eschew insisting that the values of the current profes-
sionalism crusade or any particular vision of how to be a good person and
a good lawyer is right or true, beyond dissection and critical examination.
In so doing, legal scholars have already revealed fundamental flaws
in the laissez-faire Type 1 model, the glib acceptance of which by earlier
generations of academics, and with them their students, may have contrib-
uted considerably to the present problems of frivolity and incivility.
Without pronouncing what right and good ultimately are, they have shown
how that system is unlikely to serve well those widely shared values,
discovering truth and protecting individual autonomy, that purport to be its
raison d'etre.
Their work, however, should not be, and has not been, merely
negative and critical. Rather, in the service of those values, they have
identified in the American legal tradition alternative visions of lawyering,
visions they have elaborated into alternative models of legal ethics.
Students could be presented with those models throughout the curriculum,
not just in mandatory professional responsibility courses.
Paradoxically, in declining to present any one way of lawyering as
orthodox, and insisting that all models be submitted to impartial scrutiny
as to both their aims and their success in serving those aims, the traditional
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method of legal scholarship, like that of liberal scholarship generally, is
not in fact displaying value neutrality. Rather, it is manifesting a deep-
seated, though generally only implicit, commitment to core substantive
values prized also by the professionalism crusade. In particular, it shows
a commitment to civility, understood as a tolerance for opposing views and
a preference for the least coercive means of resolving disputes, intellectual
and otherwise.
Thus, when the professionalism crusade calls upon law professors to
treat students with respect and courtesy, itis quite rightly calling them back
to their own proper role. Conversely, by fulfilling that role, academic
lawyers are indirectly inculcating professional values that transcend any
particular articulation of the proper lawyerly role. The ultimate message
of ethics, secular as well as religious, is not "This Way is Right" but rather
"Follow me." Students need to see that the modes of lawyering more
acceptable to the professionalism crusade are not just theoretically defen-
sible, but also literally viable, ways that one can really live as a lawyer. An
"ought"-even a non-categorical "ought"--implies a "can."
Here, however, legal academics encounter a problem. They can
embody the virtues of civil scholarship, and they can apply those virtues
to create theoretical justifications for the kind of lawyering the crusade
prefers. They cannot, however, themselves put those models into practice.
They cannot hold themselves and their colleagues up, even implicitly, as
role models for their students, since the vast majority of their students will
be practicing, not academic, lawyers. 95
Literature can help here, particularly the well-wrought stories of the
great masters, Dickens and Tolstoy, Faulkner and George Eliot.96 But the
verisimilitude of even the best fiction is still not the real thing. As my
students rightly point out, Atticus Finch did not face Lexis fees and
95 Anthony T. Kronman, "Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Educa-
tion." 90 YALE L. J. 955 (1981).96 Thomas Shaffer has long emphasized the importance of stories, true and
fictitious, to training in legal ethics. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith and the
Professions 1-38 (1987). See also Robert Coles, "The Keen Eye of Charles
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franchised legal clinics. Such stories work better as negative examples
than as positive ones, to illustrate the danger or dullness, rather than the
safety or excitement, of particular courses. They may forestall certain
dangerous forms of living, particularly when students' own trajectories are
in other directions. But it may take more to change directions or overcome
hesitations, and among many students there is an almost fatalistic sense
that they will have to become Type I lawyers or sacrifice their livelihoods.
True stories press as better proof against this inertia, but even true
stories are not immune to tendentious editing, as students know from a
steady diet of appellate opinions. And true stories about Brandeis and
Story tend to have a rather hollow, Olympian ring to the mill run of law
students. They realize, without the brilliance of Brandeis, that if such
brilliance is a prerequisite to a rewarding career as a public spirited private
practitioner, the way is effectively closed to them.
Mentoring programs, of the kind occasionally mentioned in the
literature of the crusade, are an effort to bridge this gap with local attorneys
and alumni, and some such relationships probably approximate the ideal:
direct, personal friendship between law students and lawyers leading the
kind of professional and personal life to which students can credibly
aspire. But one may well doubt how often the ideal is realized. Screening
for the appropriate kind of lawyers is tricky, and development of the kind
of relationship required takes a great deal of time on the part of both the
practitioner and the student. Too many mentoring programs, one suspects,
begin and end in awkward lunches with courteous strangers. -
We law professors can, however, offer a viable alternative by playing
an intermediary role. On the one hand, in the normal course of our teaching
and counselling of students, we have unparalleled opportunities to hear
their concerns and gain their trust. On the other hand, in our scholarly and
Dickens." 34 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 30, 31 (Summer/ Fall
1984) ("[The novels of Dickens, George Eliot, Tolstoy, Hardy, and Faulkner offer
us a great moral resource, one whose presence belongs...in our professional
schools.").
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law reform work, as well as in our private lives, we have ample occasion
to cultivate meaningful, substantive contact with practicing lawyers and
sitting judges. Such contacts have long been used, quite appropriately and
effectively, to help students find judicial clerkships and permanent jobs.
Along very similar lines, they can be used to put students in contact with
like-minded lawyers willing to discuss with them fundamental questions
about the very nature of being a good person and a good lawyer. Short of
that, we can tell our students about such lawyers, vouching for the virtue
and authenticity of their lives on our own authority. We can hold them up
as living and local examples, attesting to our good faith by putting
ourselves at risk that they will let us down.
This last recommendation for law academics takes us to the need,
widely recognized in the professionalism crusade, to build a community
of conscientious law academics, judges, and practitioners. Here we must
avoid two pitfalls: the expectation of universal voluntary membership and
the limitation of membership by non-liberal criteria. On the one hand, in
view of the conscientious differences of opinion about what ethical
lawyering requires, promoters of such a community should not expect
universal participation on a voluntary basis, much less try to compel
adherence. On the other hand, to the extent that they mean for the program
to promote the values of liberalism legalism at the root of the profession-
alism crusade, they must be careful not to restrict membership on extrane-
ous grounds. In particular, they must avoid the country club atmosphere
sometimes associated with traditional bar associations. It can only be a
disservice to the cause of liberal legalism to suggest, even implicitly, that
the values of civility and the rule of law either have their origins or reach
their apotheosis in the culture of the English upper-class.97 If you will
indulge a measure of understatement, a rather different view of the matter
prevailed among the founders of the American Republic, those who sought
97 It is particularly to be hoped that the Inns of Court movement, which most
nearly parallels the kind of community-building program needed to inculcate and
promote liberal legalism, will foster more than a tweedy mix of formality and
familiarity, condescension and obsequiousness. Given its implicit Anglophilia and
explicit basis on the English model of legal education, these are not idle fears.
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to vindicate the traditional rights of Englishmen as well as those who
sought to advance the universal Rights of Man.
Conclusion
The present professionalism crusade is fundamentally flawed in both
its content and its tone. Its content is reductionist, even simplistic; it
assumes that there is one true way to be a good lawyer and a conscientious
lawyer within the bounds of the law. From this assumption flows an
intolerant tone and a tendency toward overweening ambition: The crusade
seeks to become an established church, a creed to which all lawyers must
adhere.
But these flaws, though fundamental, are not fatal. The crusade could
readily redeem itself and is central message, the faith of liberal legalism,
by renouncing its categorical and universalistic claims. That faith would,
indeed, be better advanced by adopting a more tolerant and pluralistic
approach. In particular, the crusade could accede to its own disestablishment
in favor of voluntary associations of like-minded lawyers co-operating
with conscientious judges and liberal educators. Putting the matter that
way lets me conclude with a word that I have been yearning to use correctly
since the third grade: Beware antidisestablishmentarianism.
